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A cataclysmic event is sometimes the necessary 
catalyst for companies within certain industries to re-
examine, radically shift, and replace their standard 
practices with technologically-advanced alternatives.  
In the United States, the occurrence of the Coronavirus 
pandemic (“COVID-19”) during the sunsets of the 
Production Tax Credit (“PTC”) and the Investment 
Tax Credit (“ITC”) created a unique confluence of 
factors that produced a perfect storm tantamount to 
such a cataclysmic event for companies in the wind and 
solar industries, particularly developers. Over the 
years, the domestic utility-scale wind industry has come 
to rely heavily upon the PTC, while the domestic utility-
scale solar industry has come to rely significantly upon 
the ITC. Developers within each of these renewable 
energy industries originally planned to qualify for such 
federal tax credits, relying upon the presumption that 
goods would be delivered and services would be 
rendered in accordance with historical norms for 
“ordinary course of business” operations.   
 
1 Kimberly E. Diamond – Adjunct Professor of Energy Law, 
Fordham University, School of Law School, New York City, NY, U.S.,  
Email: kdiamond2@fordham.edu. This paper is dedicated to the memory of 
Michael Bernard Aaronson. Please note that this paper was written prior to the 
issuance of the Internal Revenue Service’s Notice 2021-5 on Dec. 31, 2020, and 
therefore does not discuss this item. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE [IRS], Notice 
2021-5.  Notice 2021-5 extends the beginning of construction deadline (see Part I. 
infra subsec. B.2.) to Dec. 31, 2025 for qualified offshore projects, including 
offshore wind projects, that elect to use the Investment Tax Credit (see Part II., 
infra) in lieu of the Production Tax Credit (see Part I, infra). Notice 2021-5 also 
extends the Continuity Safe Harbor (see Part I. infra subsec. B.2.) for offshore 
projects and for renewable energy projects on federal lands, for projects placed in 
service within 10 calendar years after the calendar year in which construction of the 
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This, however, did not occur.  COVID-19 
abruptly and unexpectedly emerged, with the virus’s 
widespread transmission sweeping the world during 
the end of fourth quarter 2019 and first quarter 2020.  
COVID-19’s consequences disrupted the global supply 
chain, creating workforce shortages, causing factories 
that manufactured equipment and components for wind 
farm and solar array construction to shut down, and 
presenting substantial hurdles for many developers to 
overcome in order to reach certain project construction 
and operations milestones – milestones that would have 
been readily reachable under normal circumstances.  
Irrespective of COVID-19 and its related ramifications, 
the step-down and phase-out periods of the PTC and 
ITC, respectively, nevertheless required these 
milestones to be met by certain fixed, federally-
mandated deadlines. These rigid requirements posed 
an imminent threat to many commercial wind 
developers and solar developers alike, as failure to 
meet such milestones and deadlines meant tremendous 
adverse implications for their utility-scale wind or 
solar projects. Specifically, missing a deadline under 
the PTC or ITC meant that a project either would only 
qualify for a lesser federal tax credit amount than 
originally anticipated or would be forced to forego use 
of the federal tax credit altogether.  For developers 
relying on one of these federal tax credits for purposes 
of financing their respective projects, neither of these 
alternatives were viable options.  
 
As there was no guarantee during first quarter 
2020 that either the United States Congress or the 
United States Department of the Treasury would extend 
the PTC’s and ITC’s deadlines, developers were forced 
to pivot quickly, think out-of-the-box, and innovate. 
Consequently, a heightened level of inter-industry 
collaboration occurred within both the U.S. wind and 
solar industries. Developers throughout these 
industries also began re-examining the force majeure 
provisions in their contracts, evaluating the benefits of 










include health emergencies such as pandemics, and 
considering the merits of adopting uniform standards 
across contracts, including the mandatory requirement 
that identical force majeure definitions be used across 
the multiple contracts relating to the same project. This 
elevated contract drafting standards in both the U.S. 
wind and solar industries. Moreover, developers in 
these industries not only re-thought their equipment 
procurement strategies, but they turned to 
technological innovations to mitigate and refine their 
own internal operations and maintenance (“O&M”) 
practices. This resulted in ramped-up adoption of and 
increased reliance on high-tech devices, such as drones 
and Doppler Light Detection and Ranging systems 
(“LIDAR”), which helped to automate and streamline 
many companies’ internal O&M protocols. These 
changes permanently modified the character of O&M 
standards across the domestic utility-scale wind and 
solar industries, accelerating these industries’ 
advancement down the technology continuum and 
causing them to evolve more rapidly than they would 
have ordinarily. Ultimately, while the PTC’s and ITC’s 
deadlines did eventually get extended in late May 2020, 
prior to such time, in addition to smoothing the project 
permitting process and strengthening the finance 
industry’s pre-merger due diligence disclosure 
requirements for mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) 
transactions, COVID-19’s impacts permanently 
transformed the U.S.’s wind and solar industries from 
a technological perspective, yielding positive 
operational outcomes and building resilience in both 
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Investors must have confidence that each large, state-of-the-
art, utility-scale2 wind or solar project in which they invest will receive 
sufficient financing from other sources to adequately cover that 
project’s outstanding balance of financing. The rationale for this is 
simple:  having a project’s financing “fully baked” at the project’s 
outset lessens investors’ exposure to unnecessary financial risk and 
makes the project financially viable. Federal programs in the form of 
grants, loans, and tax credits (collectively, “Federal Programs”)3 have 
often filled large gaps in renewable energy project financing, 
providing the difference between the project’s total cost of 
construction and the aggregate amount of project funding received 
from other sources. As a result of this federal government assistance, 
otherwise risk-adverse investors have gotten comfortable viewing 
these renewable energy projects as feasible investment options. The 
knowledge that the federal government will provide the balance of 
project funding has elevated such investors’ comfort level with respect 
to investing in utility-scale renewable energy projects. This level of 
comfort, in turn, has prompted such investors to outlay capital for these 
projects’ development, allowing initial financing for the projects to be 
put in place, and enabling these projects to move forward. Federal 
Programs, consequently, have played a key role in helping the U.S.’s 
young renewable energy industry evolve and progress, particularly 
within the domestic wind and solar energy sectors. 
 
 
2 Throughout this paper, the terms “utility-scale” and “commercial” will 
be used interchangeably. 
3 See Nicola Lemay, et al., “Treasury Issues Guidance for Cash Grant 
Program for Qualifying Renewable Energy Projects,” Foley Hoag LLP - Energy 
Technology and Renewables Alert, (July 14, 2009), 
https://foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2009/july/treasury-issues-
guidance-for-cash-grant-program-for-qualifying-renewable-energy-projects 
(Examples of these Federal Programs include: (i) the U.S. Treasury Cash Grant 
Program for qualifying renewable energy projects, under Section 1603 of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”); (ii) the Department 
of Energy Loan Program; and (iii) the Production Tax Credit and the Investment 
Tax Credit); see also U.S. Dept. of Energy, Advancing the Growth of the U.S. Wind 
Industry:  Federal Incentives, Funding, and Partnership Opportunities, OFFICE OF 
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Throughout this last decade, Federal Programs such as the 
Production Tax Credit4 (“PTC”) and the Investment Tax Credit5 
(“ITC”) have significantly contributed to the financial lifeblood of 
U.S.-based utility-scale renewable energy projects. For instance, in 
recent years, the U.S. wind industry has relied heavily on the PTC for 
its utility-scale projects, while the U.S. solar industry has placed 
similar reliance on the ITC for its commercial projects. These 
industries’ financial dependence on the PTC and ITC, respectively, has 
been a key factor in helping bring utility-scale projects in each of these 
sectors’ pipelines to fruition. These projects’ access to federally-
sponsored financial assistance in the form of tax credits, in turn, has 
created a robust U.S. project pipeline of commercial wind and solar 
projects,6 enabling many of these projects to be built, become 
operational, and provide a means of helping certain states in which 
they are located reach their renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”) and 
renewable energy targets.7  
 
4 See Part A., infra subsec. 1. (For an in-depth discussion of the 
Production Tax Credit.).  
5 See Part A., infra subsec. 2. (For an in-depth discussion of the 
Investment Tax Credit.). 
6 New Report: Wind Power Development Pipeline Up 40%, AM. WIND 
ENERGY ASSOC. (May 4, 2018), https://www.awea.org/resources/news/2018/new-
report-wind-power-development-pipeline-up-40 (As illustration, according to the 
American Wind Energy Association, the U.S. wind industry has experienced an 
approximately 40% year-over-year growth rate, with over 5.5 gigawatts (“GW”) 
being added to the project development pipeline in 2018 alone.); First Quarter 
Results: Records Keep Falling as Wind Pipeline Hits All-Time High, AM. WIND 
ENERGY ASSOC. (Apr. 30, 2019),  https://www.awea.org/resources/news/2019/first-
quarter-results-records-keep-falling-as-wind (In the first quarter of 2019, a record 
39,000 megawatts (“MW”) of utility-scale wind farm projects were under 
construction.); U.S. Utility Solar Pipeline Soars to 37.9 GW, a New Record, Press 
Release, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N. [SEIA] (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.seia.org/news/us-utility-solar-pipeline-soars-379-gw-new-record 
(With respect to the solar industry, according to the Solar Energy Industries 
Association, the amount of utility-scale solar photovoltaic (“PV”) installations in 
the project pipeline escalated to a record 37.9 GW in 2019, the highest amount in 
U.S. history. In comparison, during 2018, the amount of utility-scale solar PV 
installations was only 15 GW.). 
7 See, Renewable Energy Explained: Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. [EIA] (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/renewable-sources/portfolio-standards.php 
(A Renewable Portfolio Standard, or RPS, is a policy that a state adopts regarding 
its targeted amount of renewable energy usage by a fixed date. States adopt these 
policies as a means of increasing the number of renewable energy generation 
facilities within their borders. While there is currently no federal RPS, the 











The PTC and ITC, though, each possess longevity issues, 
including phase-out periods entailing significant annual reductions in 
their amounts available for tax purposes that precede these Federal 
Programs’ respective imminent sunsets. These issues have substantial 
ramifications for the U.S. wind and solar industries, both now and in 
the near future. Specifically, due to the short-term nature of the PTC 
and the ITC, the amount of federal tax credits that historically have 
been available to qualified renewable energy projects are shrinking 
substantially for certain utility-scale projects, and are being eliminated 
completely for others based on the timing of their construction, 
including when they are placed in service.  
 
The imminent fading away of both the PTC and ITC has caused 
numerous Developers8 of utility-scale renewable energy projects to 
conduct careful advanced planning regarding construction and 
operational milestones their respective projects need to meet. This 
planning allots for various delays traditionally experienced under 
“normal” conditions, thereby enabling these projects to satisfy 
federally-mandated deadlines and qualify for the maximum federal tax 
credit percentage available. Consequently, a major, unexpected hiccup 
in a utility-scale project’s originally envisioned construction timeline 
could be catastrophic, jarring the project, causing it to fall short of 
meeting construction targets, and resulting in mandatory federal 
deadlines being missed. As a result, a project that misses a federal 
deadline potentially could be forced to use a smaller tax credit 
percentage, or could be disqualified from taking advantage of the PTC 
or ITC whatsoever. 
  
 
Renewable Portfolio Goals. As of June 2019, only 13 states lacked either an RPS or 
Renewable Portfolio Goals.).  
8 SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
PROJECT FINANCE  71 (3d. ed., Cambridge Univ. Press (2008)) (A “developer” is 
the name given to the project sponsor, an entity or group of entities interested in 
developing a utility-scale renewable energy project. The developer benefits 
economically or otherwise from the construction, development, and operation of 
such a project. A “project company” is the special purpose entity that owns, 
develops, constructs, operates, and maintains the project. For purposes of this 
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Due to the enormity of the cost generally associated with 
building a utility-scale renewable energy project,9 losing all or a 
portion of this expected tax-based financing, based on a missed PTC- 
or ITC-related federal deadline, could severely disrupt or completely 
derail financing expectations. The absence of the originally expected 
tax percentage amount that a Developer was expecting to apply to its 
project’s overall cost of construction could result in a shortfall between 
the amount of funds received from the project’s other financing 
sources and the project’s actual cost of construction. This is because a 
reduction in the tax credit amount under the PTC or ITC, as applicable, 
would leave a gap between the cost savings that the originally-
anticipated tax credit amount would have provided and the actual cost 
savings that the reduced tax credit amount will provide. This financing 
gap could transform what was once a promising renewable energy 
project into a project at risk for non-completion. Such shift in financing 
could also put in jeopardy part or all of the up-front investments that a 
Developer already expended on a project, including financing from 
arranging banks,10 funds, other investment banks, and lending 
institutions that engage in debt financing (collectively, “Lenders”).11  
 
9 See Lauren Tyler, GE, Citi Close Tax Equity Financing on Block Island 
Wind Farm, NORTH AMERICAN WIND POWER [NAWP] (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://nawindpower.com/ge-citi-close-tax-equity-financing-on-block-island-wind-
farm; Block Island Wind Farm, Power Technologies (2021), https://www.power-
technology.com/projects/block-island-wind-farm/ (Depending on the number and 
size of the wind turbines involved, a utility-scale wind project can cost hundreds of 
millions or even several billion dollars to build. For instance, the Block Island 
Wind Farm, a five-turbine offshore wind farm demonstration project located off the 
Rhode Island coast and the U.S.’s first offshore wind project, received $290 million 
investments from lead arrangers Société Générale and KeyBank National 
Association, as well as $70 million in equity funding from a D.E. Shaw Group 
affiliate, in addition to tax equity financing from GE Energy Financial Services and 
Citi that took advantage of the Production Tax Credit.); see also Kimberly 
Diamond, Footfall and Social Media v. Concentrated Solar Power:  When the 
Power of Choice in a Behavior-Based Economy Can be More Powerful than the 
Power of the Sun, 28 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV., 136, 146-47 (2017), 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr/vol28/iss2/1/ (As illustration of a solar power 
project that received a large amount of funding through a Federal Program, the 
Ivanpah concentrated solar power facility, located in the Ivanpah Dry Lake in 
California’s Mojave Desert, cost approximately $2.2 billion to build, having 
received a $1.6 billion U.S. Department of Energy federal loan guarantee.). 
10 HOFFMAN, supra note 8, at 72 (Collectively, a group of arranging banks 
is often called a “syndicate,” with the lead lending bank that creates such an 
arrangement being designated as the “arranging bank.”).  
11 Id. (For instance, large projects that may receive financing from 











Against this backdrop, the global COVID-19 pandemic, as 
detailed further in Part III.A., introduced unanticipated, adverse 
rippling effects along the supply chain. Developers often source from 
other countries the materials needed to construct their renewable 
energy projects. If this materials sourcing process is disrupted for an 
extended length of time, then many Developers’ originally anticipated 
timelines for their respective U.S.-based utility-scale wind and solar 
projects also experience disruptions. The COVID-19-induced hiccup 
along the global supply chain caused such disruptions to occur. As a 
result, Developers of U.S.-based utility-scale wind and solar projects, 
respectively, were forced to suddenly pivot and adapt. This included 
re-examining standard operational procedures upon which they had 
come to rely. Flaws in common practices, such as workforce protocols, 
the absence of uniformity across contracts within the same project 
transaction, and inconsistencies among contractual terms such as force 
majeure definitions, as discussed in further detail in Part III.B.1.a., 
suddenly became evident.  
 
Addressing these weaknesses across industry standards and 
traditional norms within the domestic wind and solar industries, 
nevertheless, generated positive outcomes. COVID-19 impacts forced 
these industries to increase their reliance on technological 
advancements. Absent this COVID-19-induced disruption, 
Developers, Lenders, and other impacted entities would not likely have 
undergone such an abrupt self-evaluation. By requiring these industry 
players to re-think their standard practices, pivot, and take steps 
forward by refining or replacing their business practices with state-of-
the-art technologies, COVID-19 impacts collectively were a catalyst 
that transformed the domestic wind and solar industries, causing them 
to experience an “innovation transformation.” As a result of this 
unexpected push forward down the technological continuum that the 
domestic wind and solar industries received, these industries evolved 
at an accelerated rate, becoming more efficient, high-tech, and resilient 
than they otherwise would have been at this point in time.   
 
This paper explores how the PTC and ITC’s respective step-
down periods and phase-outs amid the COVID-19 global pandemic 
impacted the U.S. commercial wind and solar industries. It also 
illustrates how lessons learned from this experience helped players in 
the U.S. wind and solar industries to improve their resiliency much 
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provides background about the PTC and provides an overview of its 
step-down and phase-out. Part II explains the step-down, phase-out, 
and safe harbor parameters for the ITC. Part III examines COVID-19’s 
impacts on utility-scale wind and solar projects in the U.S. renewable 
energy project pipeline, given the PTC and ITC’s respective step-down 
and phase-out periods. In particular, this Part focuses on disruptions to 
the supply chain, workforce, and scheduling these projects faced as a 
result of the COVID-19 global pandemic. It also explores available 
remedies that these projects’ respective Developers used, such as 
enforcing force majeure contractual provisions and participating in the 
heightened amounts of inter-industry collaborations that became 
available, in addition to relying upon federal tax credit extensions. Part 
IV discusses specific positive outcomes that emerged as a result of 
COVID-19 for Developers and other players in the U.S. wind and solar 
industries, in terms of reliance on technological innovations to increase 
business efficiencies and improve operational streamlining. Part V 
concludes that although COVID-19 resulted in certain adverse impacts 
across the supply chain and in the wind, solar, and finance industries, 
it nevertheless proved to be an effective, though unexpected, catalyst 
for change that enabled these industries to evolve, become more 
efficient, and adopt improved practices and standards that have made 
these industries more resilient. 
 
 





For a renewable energy facility owner, which generally is the 
project’s Developer, the PTC provides a “per-kilowatt-hour (kWh)” 
federal tax rebate, based on the amount of energy the facility generates 
and sells to another, unrelated person.12 The PTC, which was originally 
enacted in 1992 to promote closed-loop biomass projects, is similar to 
 
12 Kevin Doran, Investment Tax Credit Vs. Production Tax Credit, 
HOUS.CHRON (2021), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/investment-tax-credit-vs-
production-tax-credit-67549.html; MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT:  IN BRIEF, 
(2020) (The full text of the PTC can be found in § 45 of the Internal Revenue Code 










a phoenix.13 This is because its characteristically short-term lifespan 
necessitated that it be renewed 12 times since 1999 – a vast amount of 
times within the short period of approximately two decades – having 
been resurrected and revived at three different times after it expired 
during this approximately 20-year period.14 As the PTC evolved, it 
also became available for projects in a broad range of renewable 
energy sectors, including wind, geothermal, small irrigation, 
hydropower, marine and hydrokinetic, and trash.15 While this project 
diversity enabled Developers to use the PTC across a wide range of 
projects, the PTC’s lifespan remained incredibly brief throughout each 
of its iterations.  
 
The PTC’s somewhat erratic life cycle may have been a bit off-
putting for certain investors, particularly those who preferred stability 
in the form of a tax credit that lasted for a longer period, such as 10 
years or more. As a result, such investors who nevertheless desired to 
invest in utility-scale wind projects, or any of the aforementioned types 
of domestic energy projects, had to become comfortable with the 
phasing-in and phasing-out of the PTC throughout the last two 
decades. As the U.S. wind industry has relied heavily on the PTC as a 
crucial means of financing utility-scale wind projects, it stands to 
reason that many of these investors were, in fact, able to get 
comfortable with the PTC’s repeatedly-imposed short-term lifespan 
and the concurrent renewal risk such brief lifespan carried with it. 
 
B. Qualification Requirements and the Continuity Safe Harbor 
 
1. Continuous Construction Test  
 
The PTC’s qualification requirements have been ever evolving 
and far from static. This mutability is likely to have raised concerns 
 
13Geller, Phoenix, MYTHOLOGY.NET (Sept. 29, 2018), 
https://mythology.net/mythical-creatures/phoenix/ (According to legend, a phoenix 
is a mythical, majestic, bird-like creature that resided in a perfect world. It sang a 
beautiful, yet haunting, melody before it died an extraordinary death by bursting 
into flames after catching fire while in a nest it created from herbs that ignited from 
a spark that fell from the sky. The phoenix, however, did not completely 
disintegrate into the ashes; rather, it transformed into a small worm. After three 
days, the worm morphed into a new phoenix that rose from the surrounding ashes. 
This new phoenix then began the same 1,000-year cycle, ending its life and being 
resurrected from the ashes in the same manner as its predecessor.). 
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among certain investors seeking stability and predictability for utility-
scale wind projects in which they invest. As illustration, Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) and U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(“Treasury”) Notice 2013-29 provides guidance for the two ways a 
company currently can qualify for the PTC.16 The first way is to prove 
that physical work of significant nature with respect to the project’s 
construction (“Physical Work Test”) began as of a certain date and has 
remained continuous ( “Continuous Construction Requirement”), with 
no specified minimum construction completion milestone that needs 
to be met. Collectively, the Physical Work Test and the Continuous 
Construction Requirement constitute the “Continuous Construction 
Test.”17   
 
2. Five Percent Safe Harbor Test 
 
The second way for a renewable energy project to be eligible 
for the PTC is for the project owner, or Developer, to qualify for the 
Five Percent Safe Harbor.18 This requires the project and its Developer 
to have satisfied the following two requirements:  (1) as of a certain 
date, have expended at least 5% of the project’s total property costs, 
including equipment purchase, to evidence that physical work of 
significant nature has begun on the project (“Begun Construction 
Requirement”); and (2) prove that continuous construction efforts 
remained in effect thereafter (“Continuous Efforts Test”).19 To prove 
satisfaction of the Five Percent Safe Harbor, Developers using a cash 
accounting method need to show that they “paid” 5% of the project’s 
costs, whereas Developers using an accrual accounting method – the 
most common accounting method among developers – need to show 
that they “incurred” this 5% cost amount.20 As a practical matter, the 
 
16What Happened to Wind Energy? Explaining the Production Tax Credit, 
SILVER TAX GROUP (Nov. 8, 2019), https://silvertaxgroup.com/production-tax-
credit/ [hereafter What Happened to Wind Energy?] 
17 IRS, Notice 2013-29, Sec. 4. 
18 Id. (Section 5). 
19 See Notice 2013-29, supra note17, at 3, 7; see also, Energy Credit – In 
General, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(1) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through Pub. L. No. 
116-193 9 (2020));  What Happened to Wind Energy?, supra note 16; IRS, Notice 
2016-31 Secs. 2 & 5 [hereafter Beginning of Construction]. 
20 Sam B. Guthrie, et al., AG Speaking Energy – 30% ITC Safe from 
Delivery Delays Due to Cornovirus, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP 












easiest way for a Developer to prove that it “incurred” such cost is to 
have taken title or delivery of the project property,21 such as wind 
turbine blades, towers, or other components. 
 
Collectively, the IRS refers to the Continuous Construction 
Test and the Continuous Efforts Test as the “Continuity Requirement.” 
A Developer is deemed to have satisfied the Continuity Requirement 
if its renewable energy facility is placed in service within four years 
after satisfying the Begun Construction Requirement (the “Continuity 
Safe Harbor”).22 To qualify for the PTC, then, under IRS guidance, a 
taxpayer, such as the Developer, must be deemed to have satisfied the 
Begun Construction Requirement,23 so that it can proceed to 
demonstrate the satisfaction of the Continuous Efforts Test and the 
Continuity Requirement,24 and so that the project is poised to qualify 
for the Continuity Safe Harbor.25 
 
C. Step-Down and Phase-Out 
 
Despite a wind farm Developer’s reliance on the PTC, even if 
that Developer’s utility-scale wind farm project qualifies for the PTC, 
the PTC’s currently-scheduled step-down and phase out period may 
limit the project Developer’s eligibility, so that such Developer is only 
eligible to use a reduced percentage of the PTC, rather than the full 
100% of it. Prior to May 2013, Developers that qualified for the 
Continuity Safe Harbor could take advantage of 100% of the tax 
benefit the PTC offered.26 Today, Developers are focused on 
qualifying for the PTC before its January 1, 2021 expiration date 
(“PTC Phase-Out”), also known as the PTC Cliff.27 Under the PTC 
Phase-Out, even if a project qualifies for the PTC using the standards 
 
21 Id. 
22 Beginning of Construction, supra note 19. 
23 Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley, et al., U.S. Senate, to The 
Honorable Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-04-
23%20CEG,%20RW,%20et%20al%20to%20Treasury%20(Energy%20Tax%20Cr
edits%20Safe%20Harbor).pdf (Citing IRC § 45(b)(5), § 45(d), § 48(a)(2)-(7), and § 
48(c); 2 IRS Notice 2013-29, 2018-59.; and IRS Notice 2016-31, 2018-59.). 
24 Grassley, supra note 23. 
25 See Part I., supra subsec. B.2. 
26 What Happened to Wind Energy?, supra note 16. 
27 The US Wind PTC Cliff Keeps Looking Less and Less Scary, QATAR 
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described in Part I.B. above, the project still may only be eligible to 
use a portion of the PTC, depending on whether and when the project 
began construction between 2017 – 2020 (“PTC Step-Down Period”).  
 
As illustrated in Table 1 below, in accordance with the PTC 
Step-Down Period, utility-scale wind projects that began construction 
in 2017, 2018, 2019, or 2020 will only be able to take partial advantage 
of the PTC, in the amounts of 20%, 40%, 60%, and 40% of the PTC, 
respectively.28 Developers that meet the PTC’s Begun Construction 
Requirement for a renewable energy facility prior to the PTC Phase-
Out, though, can take advantage of the PTC for 10 years after such 
facility is placed in service and satisfies the Continuity Safe Harbor.29 
However, if a project begins construction after December 31, 2020, its 




 PTC Step-Down Period and PTC Phase-Out  
Year Construction Began or Is Deemed to Have Begun  
 













2020 –  
Dec. 31, 
2020 
On or after 















Certain wind industry players are optimistic that the PTC 
Phase-Out will attract a new, broader base of investors who will 
 
28 See Energy Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(5)(E)(i) – (iv) (“(E) Phaseout of 
credit for wind facilities. In the case of any facility using wind to produce 
electricity which is treated as energy property by reason of this paragraph, the 
amount of the credit determined under this section (determined after the application 
of paragraphs (1) and (2) and without regard to this subparagraph) shall be reduced 
by — (i) in the case of any facility the construction of which begins after December 
31, 2016, and before January 1, 2018, 20 percent, (ii) in the case of any facility the 
construction of which begins after December 31, 2017, and before January 1, 2019, 
40 percent, (iii) in the case of any facility the construction of which begins after 
December 31, 2018, and before January 1, 2020, 60 percent, and (iv) in the case of 
any facility the construction of which begins after December 31, 2019, and before 
January 1, 2021, 40 percent.”); see also SHERLOCK, supra note 12, at 1 – 2. 
29 IRS, Notice 2013-29, supra note 17, at 3, 7; Energy Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 
48(a)(1). 










compete against one another for the best wind farm investment 
opportunities and, as a result of such competition, will decrease 
Developers’ capital costs.31 Under this scenario, the domestic wind 
industry would effectively develop legs upon which to stand on its 
own, so that it no longer would need to rely on federal assistance and 
would be self-sustaining. While this potential scenario may come to 
fruition, there is no guaranty that it will actually occur. 
 




Due to the PTC Step-Down Period and the PTC Phase-Out, 
investors in large renewable energy projects who disfavored the PTC 
may instead have elected to take advantage of the ITC as an alternative. 
For more than a decade, the utility-scale solar industry has relied 
heavily on the ITC, often referring to it as the Solar Investment Tax 
Credit.32 The ITC has played a key role in the solar industry’s growth 
because the 30% tax credit on equipment is highly beneficial to the 
commercial solar equipment owners and Developers 33 that have been 
receiving it.34 The Solar Energy Industries Association (“SEIA”), the 
trade association for the U.S. solar industry, acknowledges that the 
domestic solar industry has relied heavily on the ITC since its 
enactment in 2006. SEIA also acknowledges that since such time, the 
ITC has helped the U.S. solar industry flourish and increase by 
10,000%.35 In fact, since 2010, the ITC has helped the solar industry 
experience an average annual growth rate of over 50%.36 
 
 
31 Chris Brown, US Wind Market Will See More Investors and Cheaper 
Capital Without the PTC, GREENTECHMEDIA [GTM] (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ptc-sunset-means-more-investors-
for-us-wind-market. 
32 Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), SEIA (2021), 
https://www.seia.org/initiatives/solar-investment-tax-credit-itc.  
33 For purposes of this paper, the terms “equipment owner” and 
“Developer” will be used synonymously. 
34 See Part II., infra subsec. B. (Table 2). 
35 Extend the Solar Investment Tax Credit: Defend Solar Energy Jobs, 
SEIA (2021), https://www.seia.org/defend-solar-investment-tax-credit; Solar 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC), supra note 32. 
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In contrast to the PTC, which focuses on energy produced, the 
ITC is effectively a tax rebate on equipment assets. The ITC is meant 
to refund a certain percentage of a particular asset’s original purchase 
price, known as its tax basis.37 For example, a solar facility asset, or 
“energy property” under the ITC, refers to equipment that either (i) 
generates electricity to heat or cool a structure other than a swimming 
pool, provide hot water in a structure, or provide solar process heat, or 
(ii) illuminates the inside of a structure that uses “fiber-optic 
distributed sunlight” for equipment, on which construction begins 
before January 1, 2022.38 A commercial solar facility developer whose 
equipment within the solar array fulfills this “energy property” 
requirement gets to use a percentage of the equipment’s tax basis as a 
tax credit, based upon the year construction involving the equipment 
began.39    
 
B. Step-Down, Phase-Out, and Significance of the 3-1/2 Month 
Rule 
 
Similar to the PTC, the ITC is bound by the Continuity 
Requirement and is experiencing a step-down period (the “ITC Step-
Down Period”) that precedes its phase-out. This is known as its 
Evergreen Period.40 However, the ITC’s federal tax credit percentages 
available during the ITC Step-Down Period differ from those under 
the under the PTC Step-Down Period. The ITC Step-Down Period 
incentivizes solar project Developers to order their project equipment, 
take delivery or receive title to it, and place it in service so that their 
solar array is up and running as soon as possible. As Table 2 below 
illustrates, Developers have incentive to complete these steps quickly. 
This is because the ITC percentage available to them is higher the 
sooner in time that their array is completed, based upon both the date 
on which project construction began or is deemed to have begun, as 




37 Doran, supra note 12; Basis, The Free Dictionary (2003-2021), 
https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Tax+basis (The term “basis” or “tax 
basis” refers to the original purchase price of an item.).  
38 I.R.C. § 48 (a)(3)(A)(i) – (ii). 
39 I.R.C. § 48(a)(1). 











Specifically, ITC Step-Down Period focuses both on the timing 
of equipment purchase for a particular project, as well as the timing of 
construction with respect to that equipment. If construction involving 
that equipment began on December 31, 2019 or earlier, the Developer 
can receive a tax credit in the amount of 30% of that equipment’s tax 
basis (“2019 30% Tax Credit”).41 Even if the Developer did not 
actually take delivery or receive title of the equipment in 2019, if the 
Developer paid or incurred an expense for that equipment in 2019 that 
was in the amount of 5% or more of the overall cost of the project itself 
(“2019 Payment Date”), then that Developer is deemed to have 
triggered the Begun Construction Requirement. Such Developer is 
also deemed to have satisfied the Five Percent Safe Harbor 
requirement with respect to the project’s construction timeline. Based 
on reaching both of these milestones, if the Developer reasonably 
expects to take delivery or title of the equipment within 105 calendar 
days, or 3-1/2 months, following the 2019 Payment Date, then the 
Developer may claim the full 2019 30% Tax Credit (“3-1/2 Month 
Rule”).42  
 
Developers are in a much more unfavorable position if their 
project construction began or is deemed to have begun later than 
December 31, 2019, and if the project equipment is placed in service 
in 2020. This is because, as Table 2 illustrates, if a Developer triggers, 
or is deemed to have triggered, the Begun Construction Requirement 
in 2020, the Developer will receive a tax credit in the amount of only 
26% of the equipment’s basis (“2020 26% Tax Credit”),43 a 
comparatively lower tax credit than the 2019 30% Tax Credit. While 
this 4% difference in the amount of equipment tax basis that can be 
deduced appears to be small, this difference translates monetarily into 
a shortfall between the overall expected cost of the project and its 
actual cost. Such a funding deficiency can disrupt the project’s 
expected financing, thereby leaving a financing gap and having the 
potential to delay project construction and operation.  
 
A Developer’s already unfavorable position continues to 
deteriorate the longer it waits to begin construction on a solar project 
during the ITC Step-Down Period. According to Table 2, if project 
construction begins in 2021or is deemed to have triggered the Begun 
Construction Requirement in 2021, the Developer will only be able to 
 
41 I.R.C. § 48(a)(3)(A)(i) – (ii). 
42 Guthrie, et al., supra note 20. 
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deduct 22% of the equipment’s basis, an even further-reduced amount 
than was available for triggering the Begun Construction Requirement 
in either 2019 or 2020 (the “2021 22% Tax Credit,” and, collectively 
with the 2019 30% Tax Credit and the 2020 26% Tax Credit, the “ITC 
Safe Harbor Rules”).44  
 
Those solar projects that satisfy the ITC Safe Harbor Rules by 
either beginning construction or being deemed to have begun 
construction on or before December 31, 2021 may yet encounter an 
even further-reduced equipment deduction percentage. Once again, as 
Table 2 indicates, even if construction began or is deemed to have 
begun on the project, if the energy system is not placed in service on 
or before December 31, 2023, then the Developer will only receive a 
tax credit of 10% of the equipment’s basis.45 Moreover, if project 
construction begins after December 31, 2021 (“Evergreen Period”), 
this 10% tax credit will become an “evergreen”46 percentage (“10% 
Evergreen Tax Credit”)47 and will be the only ITC percentage 




44 I.R.C § 48(a)(6)(A)(ii), supra note 41; I.R.C§ 48(a)(2)(A)(i) – (ii), 
supra note 43.  
45 I.R.C § 48(a)(6)(B).  
46 Id.; Evergreen, The Free Dictionary (2003-2021), https://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Evergreen (In finance, the term “evergreen” 
generally refers to a long-term contract that automatically renews after a fixed, 
short-term period, unless the contract itself is terminated.). See I.R.C § 
48(a)(6)(A)(ii), supra note 41 (As applied to the ITC, “evergreen” means that the 
10% ITC will apply as long as the ITC is available as a federal tax credit). 
47 I.R.C § 48(a)(6)(A)(ii), supra note 41; see also Maximizing the Solar 














Solar project Developers that want to take advantage of the 
ITC, therefore, have incentive to satisfy the Begun Construction 
Requirement for their projects and have their project equipment placed 
in service as soon as possible. Developers that fulfill these 
requirements will be eligible to receive the maximum financial benefit 
available for their projects during the ITC Step-Down Period.  
 
Given the rigid parameters of the ITC Step-Down period, 
unanticipated disruptions impacting a solar project’s supply chain, 
workforce, or construction schedule can potentially derail it from 
meeting its targeted construction milestones and qualifying for the 
maximum tax credit percentage available under the ITC. Not 
surprisingly, many solar project Developers who did not anticipate or 
plan for major supply chain disruptions that substantially delayed the 
delivery of their equipment have become concerned about whether 
they, in fact, have taken sufficient steps to qualify under the ITC Safe 
Harbor Rules for purposes of having satisfied the Begun Construction 
Requirement.48 Also, many Lenders and Investors planned on the solar 
projects in which they invested taking advantage of the 3-1/2 Month 
Rule, qualifying for the Five Percent Safe Harbor, and qualifying for 
the 2019 30% Tax Credit in 2020. However, these Lenders and 
Investors may receive a rude awakening if the project in which they 
invested fails to satisfy the Begun Construction Requirement by a 
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particular cut-off date and fails to satisfy the requirements under the 3-
1/2 Month Rule. As Table 2 above illustrates, a delayed project 
increases overall project costs and may force a Developer to have a 
much smaller ITC available to it than originally anticipated. Rather 
than being able to use the 2019 30% Tax Credit, this Developer may 
instead be forced to take the lower 2020 26% Tax Credit, the 2021 
22% Tax Credit, or the 10% Evergreen Tax Credit, depending on the 
project’s construction timeline.  
 
III. COVID-19’S IMPACTS ON THE U.S. WIND AND SOLAR 
INDUSTRIES, GIVEN THE PTC’S AND ITC’S RESPECTIVE 
PHASE-OUT AND STEP-DOWN PERIODS 
 
A. Supply Chain, Workforce, and Scheduling Disruptions 
 
The Coronavirus, or COVID-19,49 triggered a global pandemic 
that claimed the lives of thousands, caused acute sickness in others, 
and disrupted business and workforce operations worldwide.50 While 
the virus purportedly originated in China,51 the rapid rate at which 
COVID-19’s transmission occurred during the end of fourth quarter 
2019 and first quarter 2020 resulted in governments around the world 
adopting measures aimed at slowing the rate of its spread. In the U.S., 
as well as in other countries, some of these measures included social 
distancing among people, requiring individuals to remain at least 6 feet 
 
49 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) – Symptoms of Coronavirus, 
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION [CDC] (Dec. 22, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html 
(The Coronavirus is a sickness that permeated the global human community 
rapidly. Its symptoms generally include cough, shortness of breath, fever, chills, 
muscle pain, sore throat, and loss of taste or smell.); Coronavirus History, WEBMD 
(2005-2021), https://www.webmd.com/lung/coronavirus-history (Thought to have 
originated in bats, SARS-CoV-2 is the strain of virus that caused COVID-19 to 
occur.). 
50 Sarwant Singh, Impact of the Coronavirus on Business, FORBES (Mar. 
2, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/2020/03/02/impact-of-the-
coronavirus-on-business/#5072cabe4414; Outmaneuver Uncertainty: Navigating 
the Human and Business Impact of COVID-19 - Pairing People with Opportunity 
Resilience, ACCENTURE (July 31, 2020), https://www.accenture.com/us-
en/about/company/coronavirus-business-economic-impact. 
51 Coronavirus History, supra note 49 (Specifically, COVID-19 is thought 
to have originated in Wuhan, China in late 2019, in an open-air “wet market” 
where people purchase animals for consumption that are slaughtered at the time of 
purchase. The crowded conditions of wet markets allow for viruses to spread 










apart from one another, and not gathering in crowds.52 These measures 
also included mandates for certain businesses to shut down their 
physical facilities, and for non-essential workers to stay at home with 
their families and “shelter-in-place” during this health emergency.53  
 
COVID-19 did not fit within the traditional rubric of project 
risks. Unlike ordinary risks such as development risks, design and 
engineering risks, construction risks, or operating risks, a global 
pandemic, while a force majeure event, was something that did not 
register on most utility-scale wind Developers’ or solar Developers’ 
radar as a potential threat. For this reason, neither the domestic wind 
industry nor the domestic solar industry anticipated either the onset of 
COVID-19 or the uncertainty its resulting impacts created in terms of 
obtaining goods and the magnitude of losses and damages these 
impacts caused. Consequently, when COVID-19 occurred, these 
Developers were suddenly faced with confronting COVID-19 impacts 
with respect to their original project timelines. Given the PTC Step-
Down Period and the ITC Step-Down Period, these Developers 
became acutely aware that COVID-19 impacts could pose real, highly 
unfavorable ramifications insofar as their ability to reach certain 
project milestones – ones that would have been reachable under 
ordinary circumstances. Moreover, these Developers realized that their 
failure to meet these milestones as a consequence of the pandemic 
would prevent them from qualifying for the maximum amount of tax 




1. Wind Industry Impacts to Utility-Scale Projects 
 
 
52 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) – Social Distancing – What is 
Social Distancing, CDC (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html. 
53 Eric Levenson, et al., What is and isn’t Allowed During a “Shelter-in-
Place” Order, CNN (Mar 18, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/17/us/shelter-
in-place-coronavirus-trnd/index.html; Jordan Culver, Can You Leave Home with 
Shelter-In-Place Order in Effect During Coronavirus Crisis? Yes, Under Certain 
Circumstances, USA TODAY (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/03/17/coronavirus-san-
francisco-california-shelter-in-place/5073397002/; Sarah Midkiff, What Does a 
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As of the beginning of first quarter 2020, many utility-scale 
wind projects were on-track to satisfy the PTC’s conditions precedent, 
as articulated in Part I.B. herein, so that they qualified for the PTC’s 
Continuity Safe Harbor. Given the PTC Step-Down Period, projects 
that actually began construction in 2019, or that were deemed to have 
begun construction in 2019, would be able to take advantage of the 
PTC at a rate of 60%, the highest PTC percentage rate available for 
Developers during the PTC Step-Down Period.54  However, projects 
that missed the window to be deemed to have begun construction 
during 2019 would instead be deemed to Have Begun Construction in 
2020. This would force these projects’ respective Developers to use 
the comparatively smaller rate of 40% of the PTC. Accordingly, due 
to the substantial difference in federal tax credit savings a project that 
was deemed to have begun construction in 2019 could receive, 2020 
was poised to be a “monster year” in terms of wind project installed 
capacity.55  
 
As a result of COVID-19 impacts, though, as of the end of first 
quarter 2020 and the beginning of second quarter 2020, utility-scale 
wind projects faced supply chain disruptions56 due to the overall 
 
54 See Part I., supra, subsec. C. (Table 1). 
55 Interview by Todd Alexander, Partner, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP 
of Ken Elser, Senior Vice President for Project Finance and M&A, DNV GL, 
EP96:  DNV GL on COVID-19 and the Renewables Industry (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.projectfinance.law/podcasts/2020/may/ep96-dnv-gl-on-covid-19-and-
the-renewables-industry/ [hereafter, Elser Interview].  
56 Sidley Austin LLP, When Coronavirus Forces Force Majeure: An 
Essential Webinar for Companies at All Stages of the Supply Chain (Mar. 19, 
2020), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/events/2020/03/when-coronavirus-
forces-force-majeure (Even in the absence of force majeure provisions in supply 
contracts or other procurement contracts, the contracting party who was to receive 
the goods has an obligation to obtain replacement goods, even if those replacement 
goods are more expensive than the originally contracted-for goods. An issue with 
this is that the good sought may be unique in the market and may be unavailable. 
This means even if the contracting party expends efforts to mitigate its damages 
and creates a paper trail to document its efforts to procure replacement goods, such 
replacement goods may be unobtainable. Alternatively, in situations where the 
supply or procurement contracts do contain force majeure provisions, the producer 
itself may have been experiencing COVID-19 impacts that prevent it from meeting 
ordinary business demands, even if the producer has a stable supply of the goods in 
question. In such situations, the producing party may invoke the contract’s force 
majeure provision, leaving the recipient party scrambling to find replacement 
goods and to potentially launch a lawsuit against the producing party.); Part III.B, 
infra subsec. 1 (Many wind farm Developers who contracted for certain equipment 










supply chain being pushed to its limits.57 Mitigation levels and 
measures taken across utility-scale wind farm projects were non-
uniform and highly project-specific.58 Each project faced its own 
unique issues with workforce shortages, equipment supply shortages, 
general construction operations, and meeting permitting timelines, 
among other things (collectively, “COVID-19 Threats”).59 In the 
aggregate, throughout the U.S. wind energy industry, COVID-19 
Threats impacted utility-scale wind projects in which approximately 
$35 billion had already been invested. Collectively, these projects were 
slated to produce approximately 25 GW60 of energy. COVID-19 
Threats placed a number of these projects in jeopardy of failing to 
qualify for the PTC’s Continuity Safe Harbor.61 Despite COVID-19 
Threats, second quarter 2020 projections indicated that the U.S. wind 
industry would nonetheless see a tremendous jump in installed 
capacity during 2020.62 During first quarter 2020 and early second 
quarter 2020, though, the COVID-19 pandemic forced an already 
overstretched U.S. wind industry to stretch further in order to enable 
the industry to reach its original, pre-pandemic installed capacity 
goals.63 
 
2. Solar Industry Impacts to Utility-Scale Projects 
 
Similar to the COVID-19 Threats facing the utility-scale wind 
industry, with respect to timing for being deemed to have begun 
 
the originally contracted-for equipment or parts, as well as for not finding suitable 
substitute goods under tight milestones and timelines that they need to meet for 
their project to qualify for the Continuity Safe Harbor.). 
57 Elser Interview, supra note 55 (For instance, the initial COVID-19-
related lockdowns in Spain and Italy heavily impacted factories in Spain and Italy 
that manufactured wind turbine parts. Many of those factories were able to re-
engage in production in mid-second quarter 2020.).  
58 Id. 
59 Grassley, supra note 23. 
60 How Much Power is 1 Gigawatt?, OEERE (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.energy.gov/eere/articles/how-much-power-1-gigawatt (“GW” is an 
abbreviation for gigawatt. A gigawatt is the equivalent of 1 billion watts. To 
illustrate one GW’s magnitude, one GW provides enough energy to power 110 
million light-emitting diode (“LED”) A19 lamps. For further frame of reference, 1 
million watts is the equivalent of one megawatt, abbreviated “MW.”).  
61 Catherine Morehouse, Bipartisan Senators Ask Mnuchin to Extend Safe 
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Construction in 2019 and qualifying for the maximum benefit under 
the PTC, the utility-scale solar industry also faced COVID-19 Threats 
for purposes of qualifying for the 2019 30% Tax Credit during the ITC 
Step-Down Period.64 Workforce shortages and difficulties related to 
transporting the appropriate workers – including specialists – to 
particular sites existed, given certain state-specific and certain site-
specific quarantine rules.65 Also, proper risk mitigation programs, 
including ways to minimize person-to-person contact, may have been 
missing for solar construction crews.66  These construction crews 
ordinarily would have needed to gather at common worksites. The 
absence of such mitigation measures meant that these crews were 
prohibited from gathering at these worksites. Consequently, a lack of 
the ability to formulate and deploy risk mitigation measures in 
standard construction practice may have resulted in project 
construction delays.  
 
Early-stage utility-scale solar projects possess a large in-person 
component at the outset of their development, due to negotiations that 
occur with landowners and permitting offices. Consequently, these 
early-stage projects were the ones most at risk for experiencing hold-
ups.67 Although Developers for these projects prudently incorporated 
time buffers into their project construction timelines with respect to 
reaching certain completion milestones, these forecasts often did not 
allot as large a time buffer as COVID-19 impacts ultimately 
warranted.68  
 
In addition to labor issues, COVID-19 impacts caused the 
utility-scale solar industry to experience supply chain disruptions that 
presented substantial delays. During first quarter 2020, many solar 
Developers were unable to obtain critical components and equipment 
 
64 Due to the shorter construction timeline associated with utility-scale 
solar projects compared to utility-scale wind projects, these solar projects tend to 
attract a different type of investor base relative to that for utility-scale wind 
projects. 
65 Elser Interview, supra note 55. 
66 COVID-19: What It Means for the Power and Utilities Industry, PwC 
(2017 – 2021), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/library/covid-19/how-covid-19-is-
impacting-power-and-utilities.html.  
67 Adam Krop, Solar Project Bottlenecks Starting to Ease, N. AM. CLEAN 
ENERGY [NACE], 12 (July-Aug. 2020), 
https://issuu.com/northamericancleanenergy/docs/nace_julaug2020-web (Must 
download to access.). 










within originally projected timelines.69 Chinese factories alone 
accounted for a 3.5 – 4 GW shortage of solar module production during 
such time, due to these factories’ shut downs.70  While this production 
deficiency was rectified early in second quarter 2020, this brief blip in 
the solar module production timeline nevertheless caused certain deals 
in the U.S. utility-scale solar market to experience mild, short-terms 
delays and adverse impacts.71 Although this slight disruption meant 
that the amount of commercial solar market growth domestically 
would be less than originally projected, as of mid-second quarter 2020, 
the U.S. solar industry was still poised to experience “very robust 
growth” for new solar installed capacity during 2020 as a whole.72  
 
B. Remedies – Force Majeure Contractual Provisions, Ramped-
Up Inter-Industry Collaborations, and Federal Tax Credit 
Extensions 
 
Throughout first and second quarter 2020, many utility-scale 
wind farm Developers and solar Developers, respectively, found 
themselves facing adverse economic circumstances, particularly for 
early-stage projects that were far from reaching financial close. 
Limited options existed as remedies to the various adverse 
circumstances they faced. As discussed below, these options consisted 
generally of taking one or more of the following approaches, which 
themselves varied in the level of control a Developer could exert 
regarding that particular remedy:  (i) the traditional contractual route 
of invoking a contract’s force majeure clause, (ii) the industry-wide 
resource sharing route, and (iii) the PTC and ITC extension route.  
 
1. The Traditional, Contractual Route – Focus on Force 
Majeure Provisions 
 
COVID-19 Threats shined a bright spotlight on the importance 
of force majeure contractual provisions and a contracting party’s 
ability to invoke its protections. Generally, at the outset of contractual 
negotiations, Developers possess a certain level of control over how 
certain terms are defined in contracts to which they are parties. 
Developers generally also possess a high level of discretion regarding 
the enforcement of terms of their existing contracts. COVID-19 
 
69 Id. 
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Threats, however, delivered a rude awakening to many such 
Developers. A number of Developers abruptly learned that certain 
contracts to which they were parties omitted crucial terms, such as 
force majeure provisions. Other Developers found that the manner in 
which contracts to which they were parties either defined force 
majeure triggers too vaguely or not inclusively enough to cover 
COVID-19 itself or the COVID-19 Threats that befell them. These 
Developers whose contracts did not provide them with sufficient force 
majeure protections often found themselves in unfortunate 
predicaments.  
 
a. No Standardized Force majeure Provisions in Wind and 
Solar Contracts 
 
In certain industries, standardized forms of contracts exist. The 
terms of the contracts have undergone rigorous vetting among industry 
experts, and everyone industry-wide who uses these contracts begins 
from the same common baseline. This standardization sets reliable 
expectations among all parties. It also ensures that parties to the same 
contract start at a level playing field. For instance, in the swaps and 
credit derivatives industry, all contracting parties use forms that 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) developed. 
Each swap or derivative transaction begins with an ISDA Master 
Agreement (“Master Agreement”) that contains standardized, fixed 
provisions that are accepted internationally. The contracting parties 
can then either enter into the Master Agreement as is, or they can agree 
to add a contract-specific ISDA Schedule, ISDA Credit Support 
Annex, and other standard ISDA form documents of their choosing to 
modify or clarify the Master Agreement’s standard terms.73  
 
In contrast to the swaps and derivatives industry, neither the 
wind industry nor the solar industry possesses standard form contracts. 
This means that neither supply contracts between a Developer and its 
 
73See About ISDA, ISDA (2021), https://www.isda.org/about-isda/ (ISDA 
Master Agreements, ISDA Schedules, and ISDA Credit Support Annexes 
(“CSAs”) are agreements commonly used globally for documentation purposes 
with respect to over-the-counter (“OTC”) swaps and derivatives contracts. The 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association designed these documents with 
the aim of making the global swaps and derivatives market safer and more efficient 
for transacting parties.); see also Schedule to the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, 
ISDA (2021), https://www.isda.org/book/schedule-to-the-2002-isda-master-











suppliers, nor Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Contracts 
(“EPC Contracts”) between a Developer and its respective contractors 
contain across-the-board, standard form provisions. Rather, 
contractual provisions are largely left to the discretion of the 
contracting parties during the contract negotiation process, including 
force majeure clauses. Force majeure clauses commonly appear in 
construction-related contracts as a safeguard to protect the contracting 
parties in case an unexpected event occurs that prevents them from 
performing their contractual obligations. Generally, force majeure 
clauses cover circumstances beyond the contracting parties’ control 
that could not have been avoided through the exercise of reasonable 
care.74 Parties to a supply contract or an EPC Contract have discretion 
to either include or omit certain provisions, such as a force majeure 
clause, during the contract negotiation and drafting process.  
 
Such discretion among drafting parties also means that there is 
room for inconsistencies among EPC Contracts, supply contracts, and 
other various contracts that have been negotiated for a single project. 
This is especially the case if a project is an “international project” in 
which different parties involved for different purposes in the project’s 
overall effectuation may be based in different locations globally.75 
Also, because these parties may have different lawyers negotiating 
their contractual terms, the respective force majeure provisions across 
contracts for the same project may differ from one another.76 These 
inconsistencies, in turn, may result in certain parties being excused 
from their contractual performance obligations while other parties are 
not.77 Although these differences within the definition of a single 
 
74 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Force Majeure, 645 (6th ed. 1990). 
75 HOFFMAN, supra note 8, at 61, 119-209 (Notably, a “resurrection 
clause” may cure the inconsistency among force majeure clauses within contracts 
that relate to a single project. Such a clause enables the contractor to agree with the 
project company that where force majeure inconsistencies exist among the 
project’s contracts, the contractor and the project company both agree that the relief 
afforded to one of these parties will not be greater than the relief available to the 
other party under the other relevant project contracts. Using a resurrection clause 
ensures that the same relief available in the project contracts must also be available 
in the energy off-take sales agreement, the contract between the project company 
and the entity that will be purchasing the product or service that the project 
company generates. Having a resurrection clause also may enable a contractor to 
delay performance, rather than be excused from performance entirely. This may 
enable the project to still meet its timing milestones and enable it to satisfy its 
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defined term may not be dramatic, they nevertheless can be significant 
enough to lead to substantial disruptions within the project’s original 
construction schedule that may significantly impact the project’s 
economics.78  
 
b. Nebulous Nature of “Force Majeure” Definitional 
Content and Why Defining This Phrase Properly May 
Offer Clients Protection in the Future 
 
i. Defining What Constitutes a “Force Majeure” 
 
Even for those contracts containing a force majeure provision, 
there is no uniform standard for how to define a “force majeure” event. 
Accordingly, a force majeure clause can be defined in a multitude of 
different ways, allowing for broad diversity in the scope of its 
definition. As a result, the elements constituting a force majeure under 
one contract may be different from what constitutes a force majeure 
under another. This is why foresight in contract drafting plays a critical 
role. A lawyer’s ability to think like a businessperson by anticipating 
potential future risks and addressing those risks in contractual 
provisions, such as by the well-crafted terminology included in a force 
majeure clause’s definition, may prove extremely beneficial to that 
lawyer’s client. As case law illustrates, such as in the United 
Kingdom’s case Pink Floyd v. EMI Records,79 this type of savvy 
contract drafting offers clients protections that may prove financially 





79 See Pink Floyd v. EMI Records, [2010] EWHC Ch D 533, HIGH CT. OF 
JUST., Case No. HC09CO0991 (UK) (para. 46-47, 52-53) (In Pink Floyd v. EMI 
Records, the lawyer(s) negotiating the contract on behalf of their mega-successful, 
globally acclaimed rock band client, Pink Floyd, had the foresight to define 
“Records” broadly, so that they consisted of “any sound alone devices . . . now 
known and currently exploited together with formats to be devised and derived as a 
whole or in part from the Master Tapes” (emphasis added). Including this forward-
looking language was a brilliant move on the part of Pink Floyd’s lawyers, as the 
court interpreted the “true construction” of this definition as capturing the 
contracting parties’ intent to preserve the artistic integrity of the sound recordings 
in any medium. Accordingly, this definition enabled Pink Floyd to prevail on its 
summary judgment motion and preserve its rights to collect royalties in a new 
medium, digital sound, a technology that did not yet exist at the time that the 











Generally, a force majeure clause is broader than a more 
narrow “Act of God”80 clause that only includes events resulting from 
the “direct, immediate, and exclusive” forces of nature, without any 
human control or influence, that no amount of human foresight or 
reasonable degree of care or diligence could have prevented.81  For 
instance, a force majeure clause may also include lockouts, labor 
disputes, wars, strikes, and embargos as an excuse for performance.82 
In addition to these specifically articulated risks, a force majeure 
clause can contain more general language that is intended to shield all 
project parties against more unquantified, nebulous, adverse risks. For 
instance, a force majeure clause may include broad language, such as 
“other casualties that materially and adversely affect the business or 
properties or the operation of the Developer, or materially and 
adversely affects the ability of any project participant to perform its 
obligations under any project document to which it is a party.”83 This 
type of phrasing, however, is subjective and leaves room for debate 
among the contracting parties as to what events fall within this phrase’s 
parameters. 
 
ii. Determining Whether COVID-19 Constitutes a 
“Force Majeure” Event 
 
Whether or not COVID-19 qualifies as a force majeure event 
depends on the wording of the force majeure definition in the 
particular contract at issue, if, indeed, that contract even contains such 
a provision. With respect to natural disasters, “force majeure” is 
generally limited to generic geological events, such as earthquakes and 
fires, or hydrological events, such as floods.84 Given this general rule, 
classifying COVID-19 as a “physical natural disaster”85 may stretch 
 
80 See HOFFMAN, supra note 8, at 132 (In certain cultures, the phrase “Act 
of God” is considered offensive, due to its being considered disrespectful and 
derogatory with respect to certain religious beliefs. Articulating the actual potential 
risks, or using a phrase that makes broad reference to potential risks, is a preferable 
alternative.).  
81 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Act of God, 33 (6th ed. 1990) (Examples of 
an Act of God include physical events, such as accidents resulting from lightning, 
tornados, or perils of the sea, among other things.).  
82 HOFFMAN, supra note 8, at 132. 
83 Id. 
84 COVID-19 and the Solar Industry - Application to COVID-19, 4 PwC 
(Mar. 2020), https://www.pwc.com.au/legal/assets/legal-covid19-solar-industry-
040320.pdf [hereafter COVID-19 and the Solar Industry]. 
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the ordinary meaning of the force majeure phrase beyond the scope of 
the originally-intended business purpose among the contracting parties 
at the time they entered into their written agreement. Moreover, 
because there is speculation that COVID-19 may have originated in a 
laboratory rather than in nature,86 and because of the manner in which 
humans assisted in its rapid global transmission, it is arguable that 
COVID-19 may not be considered a “natural” occurrence, but instead, 
may be considered the result of human activity.87 If the human activity 
was, indeed, involved in COVID-19’s origin, this becomes significant 
for contractual purposes.  Specifically, the intent to create COVID-19 
in a laboratory setting raises the issue of whether COVID-19 was a 
foreseeable outcome, and therefore disqualifies it from falling under 
the protections of the force majeure clause.  
 
Certain definitions of “force majeure,” though, may be defined 
more broadly to include triggering events such as an “epidemic,” a 
“national emergency,” or “biological contamination.”88 A contract 
containing this expansive language in its force majeure definition may 
enable its contracting parties to experience more ease in qualifying 
COVID-19 as a force majeure event, particularly as the World Health 
Organization has classified COVID-19 as a “Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern.”89 From a lessons learned perspective, 
parties to supply contracts and EPC Contracts are now acutely aware 
of the need for a force majeure provision to appear in these contracts 
as a safeguard, and for such provisions to be drafted with clearly 
articulated, yet comprehensive, criteria that provides greater certainty 
 
86 See Eric Mack, Nobel Bio Researcher: COVID-19 Was Lab Accident, 
NEWSMAX (Apr. 19, 2020),  https://www.newsmax.com/us/hiv-malaria-wuhan-
lab/2020/04/19/id/963563/ (Nobel Prize-winner Luc Montagnier, a French 
professor and virologist, speculated that the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory 
in Wuhan, China was endeavoring to find a cure for the AIDS virus when, as part 
of an industrial accident, the vaccine being tested escaped. His theory was that 
SARS-CoV-2 contains elements of malaria and HIV because since the early 
2000’s, this laboratory has been specializing in experiments with 
coronaviruses.).See also Jack Brewster, A Timeline of the COVID-19 Wuhan Lab 
Origin Theory (May 24, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackbrewster/2020/05/10/a-timeline-of-the-covid-19-
wuhan-lab-origin-theory/?sh=65f2d6605aba (Article presents a timeline from Jan. 
26 – May 24, 2020, highlighting statements from various scientists and U.S. 
officials regarding the diversity of opinions regarding the potential origins of 
COVID-19.)  












regarding covered occurrences rather than vague, generic references 
and subjective terminology.90 
 
c. Reservation of Right to Claim a Force majeure vs. 
Quantifying COVID-19’s Impacts  
 
According to Ken Elser, Senior Vice President for Project 
Finance and M&A at DNV GL,91 at the outset of the COVID-19 
quarantine process, most major manufacturers and major EPC 
contractors whose contracts contained force majeure provisions 
registered their reservation of right to claim that a force majeure event 
had occurred, despite the actual COVID-19 impacts on their business 
operations not being well-quantified at the time they asserted such 
reservation.92  The Developers, who would have had an obligation to 
mitigate their damages and find substitute goods and services to 
replace those under their EPC Contracts and supply contracts,93 
generally pushed back when their respective contractual counterparties 
made such reservations, arguing that a counterparty cannot claim that 
a force majeure event had been triggered and had occurred until after 
such time as the impacts of the COVID-19 Threats they sustained had 
been quantified.94 This “dance” between parties to the same contract 
not only occurred between Developers and their contractors, but also 
occurred between Developers and their grid interconnection providers 
when grid interconnection networks were unable to be built-out 
quickly enough to support projects coming on-line to the electric 
power grid.95  
 
The take-away from using contractual provisions to address 
COVID-19 impacts on supply chain and workforce issues is that even 
 
90 Id. 
91 About US, DNV GL, https://www.dnvgl.com/about/index.html (DNV 
GL is a global, independent expert in risk management and quality assurance 
relating to energy projects.). 
92 Elser Interview supra note 55 (These reservations of right were 
essentially an indication that an adverse impact may arise. By making this 
reservation of right, those who made this claim aimed to preserve their right to 
claim in the future that an actual force majeure event, indeed, had occurred and that 
it had adversely impacted their ability to perform their contractual obligations.).  
93 See Sidley Austin LLP, supra note 56 (For a discussion of how a force 
majeure impacts replacement of goods and business demands.); see also COVID-
19 and the Solar Industry, supra note 84. 
94 See Sidley Austin LLP, supra note 56 (As of mid-second quarter 2020, 
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if their contracts contain well-defined force majeure clauses, 
Developers may still be at risk for immediate losses that are not easily 
mitigatable. While waiting for losses to be fully quantified at some 
future date may be the most fair and reasonable approach to assess 
accurately certain damages that occurred, a Developer may still sustain 
real-time, real-world impacts in the interim. These impacts could 
threaten the Developer’s viability as a going concern, could cost the 
Developer millions of dollars in the future based on milestones missed 
to qualify for the maximum available federal tax credits, or could cause 
the project itself to become permanently derailed. Reliance on force 
majeure contractual provisions, therefore, may not act as a shield 
against immediate damages, but, rather, may only act as a bandage to 
treat retrospectively certain contractual issues that arose as a COVID-
19 consequence.    
 
2. Ramped-Up Inter-Industry Collaborations 
 
Developers generally determine whether or not they share their 
resources with their industry competitors. Even if they are generous 
and share their resources with these competitors, they have no 
guarantees that their competitors will reciprocate with respect to the 
resources under the competitors’ control. During historically “normal” 
circumstances, many Developers would not be willing to undertake 
such “sharing” risk. Interestingly, though, COVID-19 provided 
businesses in the wind and solar industries, respectively, with an 
opportunity to undergo a Renaissance of sorts in terms of engaging in 
a culture of mutual assistance. Social science research indicates that 
when others perceive players in the same game acting generously 
toward one another, they, too, tend to act generously.96  
 
These findings, in fact, played out among utility-scale wind 
Developers and solar Developers during first quarter 2020 and second 
quarter 2020, when COVID-19 impacts across the labor and 
equipment supply chains were the most sudden and unexpected. Many 
companies, particularly Developers, collaborated together to assist one 
another, drawing upon the broader power industry’s century-long 
tradition of sharing. 97 Given COVID-19’s impacts on personnel and 
 
96 FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE:  PURSUING PROFIT WITH PURPOSE 49 (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
Inc., 2018). 
97 COVID-19: What It Means for the Power and Utilities Industry, supra 










the supply chain alike, “sharing” among Developers included sharing 
workforce members and supplies. This cooperation among Developers 
aided in resolving labor deficiencies and supply chain sourcing for 
both human capital and equipment resources that were in short supply 
and were difficult to procure during the first half of 2020.98  
 
Due to Developers shifting into survival mode during COVID-
19, though, while a culture of increased cooperation and helpfulness 
may have existed, it did so within a broader, survival of the fittest 
culture bubble. For example, within the solar industry, the spirit of 
sharing and cooperation did not extend to all impacted Developers. In 
fact, as of mid-second quarter 2020, the U.S. solar industry did not 
possess an industry-wide, collaborative approach to assist those in 
need, such as changes in companies’ operations and strategies in 
response to these impacted contemporaries.99 Accordingly, ramped-up 
collaborations may have helped to keep only certain utility-scale solar 
projects afloat, while other utility-scale projects may not have been 
able to progress or survive.100 This loss of originally-projected utility-
scale solar project growth is why SEIA stated that the solar sector 
could lose half its 250,000 workers and billions of dollars in solar 
project investments in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19-induced 
economic shutdown.101  
 
3. Federal Tax Credit Extensions 
 
As of mid-second quarter 2020, there were two ways that the 
PTC, as well as the ITC, could be extended: (i) through Treasury 
(“Treasury Approach”) or (ii) through Congress (“Congressional 
Approach”).102 A number of U.S. Senators who were members and 
leaders of the Congressional Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee took the initial steps to accomplish the Treasury Approach 
by submitting a written request to Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin 
on April 23, 2020 (“Congressional Request”).103 This Congressional 





101 Catherine Morehouse, Bipartisan Senators Ask Mnuchin to Extend Safe 
Harbor Deadlines for Renewable Projects, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/bipartisan-senators-ask-mnuchin-to-extend-safe-
harbor-deadlines-for-wind-s/576757/; see also Grassley, supra note 23. 
102 Morehouse, supra note 61. 
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amended so that both the PTC and the ITC safe harbors would be 
extended one more year for projects that began construction in 2016 
and 2017.104 If approved, this amendment would have the effect of 
extending the Continuity Safe Harbor, so that projects placed in service 
within five years, rather than four years, after satisfying the Begun 
Construction Requirement would qualify for this protection.  
 
Given the COVID-19 Threats that were rattling both the U.S. 
wind and solar industries at the time of the Congressional Request’s 
submission, many domestic utility-scale wind and solar projects were 
poised to benefit from a federally-imposed longevity extension for the 
PTC and ITC, respectively. Despite these circumstances, there was no 
guarantee that Treasury, indeed, would grant such an extension. 
Moreover, if Treasury did not grant such an extension, there was no 
back-stop guarantee that Congress would grant such an extension 
either. Given the time parameters of the impending PTC and ITC 
sunsets, many Developers did not have the benefit of time to await a 
response and linger in a state of limbo with respect to making 
reparations to their disrupted construction schedules. Rather, these 
Developers necessarily had to make certain strategic decisions, such 
as those discussed in Part V below, to take immediate actions and to 
keep their projects progressing forward on a steady course and at an 
accelerated speed to compensate for such disruptions.  
 
On May 7, 2020, Treasury responded to the Congressional 
Request in a 3-sentence letter (“Response Letter”), announcing 
vaguely its “plans to modify the relevant rules in the future.”105 The 
American Council on Renewable Energy (“ACORE”) and the 
American Wind Energy Association (“AWEA”),106 the trade 
association for the U.S. wind industry, generally interpreted this 
language as meaning that the Treasury Approach would, in fact, be 
 
104 Id.; see also Grassley, supra note 23. 
105 Letter from Frederick W. Vaughan, Principal Deputy Assistant 




106 See Tax Policy – Post-PTC Wind, AWEA, at 
https://www.awea.org/policy-and-issues/tax-policy (For years, the U.S. wind 
industry has been preparing itself for the PTC’s non-renewal. As AWEA’s website 
indicates, while the PTC has been helpful in “establish[ing] a reliable, competitive 
domestic wind industry,” AWEA expects the wind industry to “remain strong” 










adopted, given that Treasury was on-board with extending the Begun 
Construction requirement as well as the placed in service deadlines, so 
that renewable energy projects at-risk for not meeting these deadlines 
once again would have the opportunity to satisfy the Continuity 
Requirement and qualify for the Continuity Safe Harbor.107 SEIA’s 
position regarding the Response Letter, though, was less enthusiastic, 
indicating that SEIA would continue to push for the Congressional 
Approach, so that Congress would develop a legislative solution with 
respect to these federal tax credits, particularly the ITC.108  
 
To the relief of both the wind industry and the solar industry, 
on May 27, 2020, Treasury and the IRS collectively issued Notice 
2020-41,109 which eliminated the need for the Congressional Approach 
regarding PTC and ITC extensions. For the wind industry, Notice 
2020-41 officially extended the Continuity Safe Harbor to five years 
for renewable energy projects that began construction in either 2016 
and 2017, satisfied the Begun Construction Requirement, and were 
placed in service “no more than five calendar years after the calendar 
year during which construction with respect to that qualified facility or 
energy property began.”110 Projects that satisfied this current 
Continuity Safe Harbor would qualify for the PTC.111   
 
For the solar industry, Notice 2020-41 also extended the ITC’s 
Five Percent Safe Harbor through the creation of a safe harbor for the 
3-1/2 Month Rule (the “3-1/2 Month Safe Harbor”).112 The 3-1/2 
Month Safe Harbor provides “certainty and assurance” to solar 
 
107 Emma Foehringer Merchant, US Treasury to Tweak Tax Credit 




109 See IRS Notice 2020-41, Beginning of Construction for Sections 45 
and 48; Extension of Continuity Safe Harbor to Address Delays Related to COVID-
19 – Section 3. Extension of the Continuity Safe Harbor for Sections 45 and 48, 7, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-20-41.pdf;  see also Treasury, IRS Provide Safe 
Harbor for Taxpayers that Develop Renewable Energy Projects -  IR-2020-106, 
IRS (May 27, 2020),  https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/treasury-irs-provide-safe-
harbor-for-taxpayers-that-develop-renewable-energy-projects. 
110 IRS Notice 2020-41, supra note 109. 
111 Michael Bates, PTC and the IRS:  Safe Harbor Extended One Year, 
NAWP (May 28, 2020), https://nawindpower.com/ptc-and-the-irs-safe-harbor-
extended-one-year. 
112 See IRS Notice 2020-41, supra note 109 (Section 4. Safe Harbor for 3-
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Developers by explicitly stating that if they paid for property or 
services for their respective projects on or after September 16, 2019, 
they would be deemed to have had a reasonable expectation of 
receiving those items within 3-1/2 months of that 2019 Payment Date, 
provided that they received such items on or before October 15, 
2020.113   
 
Indeed, the Continuity Safe Harbor and the 3-1/2 Month Safe 
Harbor enabled both the U.S. wind and solar industries to take a 
collective breath of relief due to the deadline extensions that Notice 
2020-41 provided for both the PTC and the ITC. However, this relief 
came only after weeks of uncertainty that Developers in these 
industries experienced just waiting to see if either Treasury or 
Congress would, in fact, grant relief in the form of PTC and ITC safe 
harbor extensions. This waiting period provided both industries with a 
harsh reminder that heavy reliance on federal tax credits may not be 
the best approach for project actualization going forward. It also hit 
home the point that each of these industries’ ability to find their own 
financing legs on which to stand, absent a large crutch of federal 
incentives, may be an alternative approach to project financing worth 
considering. 
 
IV. THE POSITIVES FROM COVID-19 – IMPACTS ON BUSINESS 
EFFICIENCIES, OPERATIONAL STREAMLINING, AND INCREASED 
RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 
 
While the COVID-19 pandemic spotlighted longevity issues 
with the PTC and the ITC in a very unexpected and unusual manner, 
it also forced business leaders, including Developers, to shift into 
survival mode by undergoing intense, introspective reviews of their 
internal operational practices – something which may not have 
otherwise occurred until years later, if at all. As a result of this internal 
analysis, many Developers implemented business practices that made 
their businesses more nimble and efficient. This included streamlining 
operations, lowering operational costs, undertaking better social 
practices, and adopting or increasing reliance on cutting-edge, 
technologically-advanced devices, such as drones and LIDAR114 
sensors, to improve services that also provided positive environmental 
benefits. Through this abrupt pivoting born out of necessity, 
 
113 Id. at 8. 
114 Part IV., infra subsec. B (For a definition of LIDAR and a more in-










Developers became more receptive to thinking outside the box and 
working in novel, creative ways to move their projects forward.115 
Arguably, as a result of these shifts, Developers adopted improved 
corporate management strategies, potentially creating better long-term 
value for both their respective companies and investors.116  
 
A. Greater Drone Usage 
  
In terms of operations, maintenance, and safety, as a result of 
Developers re-examining their standard protocols, many Developers 
opted to streamline certain tasks by integrating greater reliance on 
technological innovations, such as drone usage, into their routine 
practices. For instance, to reduce their need for in-person, on-site 
facility visits during shelter-in-place measures, certain wind 
Developers became more heavily reliant on drone usage for remote 
monitoring purposes.117 This increased reliance on automated drone 
inspections reduced the need for human inspections, solving 
workforce-related limitations. Drone inspections also indirectly 
enhanced safety measures for on-site workers by decreasing the 
number of people on the project site.118 In addition to this drone usage 
strategy lessening the on-site human interactions that otherwise would 
have needed to occur,119 this strategy also produced environmental 
benefits. In particular, placing greater reliance on drones contributed 
to high levels of avoided carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles, 
airlines, and other means of transportation that Developers would have 
had to use to import labor from far away locations to their respective 
project sites. Developers’ ability to work closely with the investment 
community during COVID-19 also helped to accelerate the investment 
community’s adaptation timeline for getting comfortable with 
heightened levels of drone usage, greater reliance on data collected 
from drones, and decreased frequency of in-person site visits.120 
 
 
115 Elser Interview, supra note 55; Interview by Todd Alexander, Partner, 
Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP of Richard Dovere, Co-Founder and Managing 
Member of C2 Energy Capital, EP105:  Distributed Generation’s Reaction to 
COVID-19 (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.projectfinance.law/podcasts/2020/june/ep105-distributed-generations-
reaction-to-covid-19/. 
116 ALEXANDER, supra note 96, at 47. 
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Effectively, COVID-19 Threats catalyzed wind and solar 
Developers alike to become more efficient, causing them to modify 
longstanding, traditional industry operational protocols regarding the 
labor force and labor usage. Additionally, COVID-19 Threats may 
have provided a needed push for Developers that previously were 
hesitant to transition to a more automated workforce status. 
Developers’ taking these forced, and perhaps uncomfortable steps 
forward, nonetheless, helped both the commercial wind and solar 
industries to evolve through a widespread adoption more resilient 
operational practices that will set new benchmarks from a custom and 
usage perspective within both industries. Not only did Developers in 
these industries re-evaluate ways to cut workforce costs and build 
efficiencies by gathering data through drone usage, but this greater 
reliance on technological know-how also assisted in establishing a 
more robust, reliable track record for drone usage and drone data 
collection in both industries.121 COVID-19 Threats, consequently, 
helped to ramp-up drone usage, heralding what may be a permanent 
shift in traditional industry operational standards for drone usage. 
 
B. Increased Reliance on LIDAR 
 
Traditionally, within the utility-scale wind industry, 
Developers erect meteorological masts (known as “met masts”) to 
measure wind direction and gather wind speed data at fixed locations, 
a practice that assists at a macro level in optimizing wind farm layouts 
and assists at a micro level in determining where to site individual 
wind turbines at specific locations, including the direction each turbine 
faces.122 Moreover, met masts can also gather data relating to wind 
 
121 Id. 
122 See Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Energy Purchase 
Agreements (EPAs), WORLD BANK GROUP (Mar. 22, 2020), 
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/sector/energy/energy-power-
agreements/power-purchase-agreements; Kimberly E. Diamond, Wake Effects, 
Wind Rights, and Wind Turbines: Why Science, Constitutional Rights, and Public 
Policy Issues Play a Crucial Role, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 813, 
815, 832 (2016), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol40/iss3/5/ (Wind 
turbine siting has significant monetary implications for Developers, as optimizing 
the wind flow to a particular wind turbine placed on a certain parcel enables that 
turbine to produce a greater amount of energy. Over the course of the wind 
turbine’s useful life of approximately 20 – 30 years, the aggregated amount of 
energy a single wind turbine produces can be significant. A turbine’s energy output 
factors into a wind farm’s ability to meet its energy deliverability requirements 










wakes, turbulence, and wind speed impacts resulting from adjacent, 
neighboring wind farms on which utility-scale turbines have already 
been placed.123 The downside of met mast installation, though, is that 
a single met mast generally requires eight or more individuals to install 
it properly.124 As a result of social distancing requirements aimed at 
reducing the spread of COVID-19,125 wind farm Developers were 
essentially required to have fewer people on the job as a safety 
precaution measure.126 This forced reduction in on-site staff caused 
Developers to break from tradition, improvise, and seek alternatives to 
using met masts to gather wind data.127  
 
Doppler LIDAR128 sensors proved to be a viable solution to 
address this met mast issue. LIDAR, a ground-based, state-of-the-art, 
advanced remote sensing measurement technique, has grown in 
popularity across the global wind industry during the course of the last 
decade.129 Not only are LIDAR sensors easy to install, including in 
areas with topographically complex terrain, but, compared to met 
masts, they take approximately one-third of the time to erect.130 Due 
to COVID-19 Threats, particularly workforce shortages, Developers 
that had not already shifted to LIDAR in place of met masts were 
effectively forced to make this technological transition. Although 
Developers that originally prepared to use met masts did not anticipate 
implementing this change, pivoting to a LIDAR system enabled them 
to capture needed wind data safely, comply with workforce social 
distancing mandates,131 and stay on-schedule with respect to meeting 
 
or other power-generating facility and the energy off-taker, generally an electric 
utility, which also factors into the wind farm’s profitability.).  
123 Diamond, supra note 122, at 818. 
124 Ameya Paseband, How Tech is Driving Wind Success Post-Pandemic, 
NACE, 40, 41 (July – Aug. 2020). 
125 See Part III., supra subsec. A. 
126 Paseband, supra note 124, at 41. 
127 Id. at 40–41. 
128 See What Is Lidar?, NAT’L OCEAN SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., AND U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE [NOAA] (Dec. 4, 2020), 
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lidar.html (“LIDAR” is the abbreviated term 
used to describe Doppler Light Detection and Ranging systems. This remote 
sensing method uses pulses from laser light in combination with other atmospheric 
data to generate precise, three-dimensional information with respect to land 
topography.). 
129 Paseband, supra note 124, at 41.  
130 Id. (Whereas a met mast generally takes approximately three days to 
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their respective projects’ development milestones. It also provided 
them with an opportunity to advance technologically, enabling them to 
catch up to and be on par with other industry players who had already 
taken this innovative step forward. Collectively, this shift in high-tech 
equipment choice further solidified LIDAR technology’s place as the 
industry standard for wind data collection, while streamlining the 
workforce needed to gather this data. 
 
C. Streamlining of the Project Permitting Process 
 
COVID-19 also spurred the streamlining of the project 
permitting process, particularly in the utility-scale solar industry. 
During the first and second quarters of 2020, permitting offices, or 
Authorities Having Jurisdiction (“AHJs”), were adverse to changing 
their standard practices, causing public hearings to be put on hold and 
creating permitting bottlenecks.132 Following this period, though, 
certain AHJs, particularly in New York and Maine, began to adopt 
technology-based practices that allow for the virtualization and 
standardization of the permitting process.133 Consequently, while 
COVID-19 Threats may have hindered the permitting process for 
certain utility-scale solar projects, working through the difficulties 
these projects experienced provided a means for employing 
technology to overcome permitting hurdles. This technological leap 
forward will assist future solar products during each’s respective 
permitting process, insofar as it will reducing permitting costs134 and 
potentially smooth and accelerate the permitting process itself.  
 
D. Re-Evaluation of Sources for Equipment Procurement 
 
COVID-19 Threats also caused Developers to re-evaluate their 
equipment procurement practices along the supply chain. Prior to 
COVID-19, if sufficient time buffers were built into the equipment 
component delivery schedule, Developers historically were 
comfortable with ordering these components from manufacturers 
across the globe.135 As a result of COVID-19 Threats, however, many 
 
132 Krop, supra note 67, at 12. 
133 Id. at 13. 
134 Id. 
135 See David Nurse, 2019 Top 10 Wind Turbine Manufacturers – Wind 
Supplier Analysis, ENERGY ACUITY (July 31, 2019),  
https://energyacuity.com/blog/2019-top-10-wind-turbine-manufacturers/ (For 










Developers became laser-focused on the sources from which they 
ordered their equipment.136 They also reconsidered the sufficiency of 
contractual terms and delivery schedule time buffers, particularly 
those Developers who anticipated building more projects in the 
future.137 Investors also demanded not only a higher degree of scrutiny 
with respect to project schedules, but also with respect to project 
budgets and financial reserves.138 As a result, many Developers 
engaged in a self-evaluation of their procurement practices, 
determining ways to mitigate against their financial reserves’ depletion 
by revisiting their choices of equipment suppliers, revamping their 
standard practices regarding budget and schedule risk, and identifying 
areas for improvements in contractual provisions that would mandate 
more lengthy time buffers for equipment delivery for future projects. 
Collectively, due to Developers tweaking their equipment purchasing 
practices, the overall effect going forward will likely be a more 
resilient procurement supply chain for the wind and solar industries.  
 
E. Banking Community’s Refinement of Pre-Merger Due 
Diligence Requirements 
 
Lenders also strengthened their due diligence practices with 
respect to merger and acquisition (“M&A”) transactions as a result of 
COVID-19 impacts. Lenders are risk-adverse by their very nature. 
They are also in the business of making money from interest paid over 
a fixed period of time on the debt instruments into which they enter 
with their borrowers. To earn this money, Lenders invest large 
amounts of capital in borrowers’ projects to optimize the amount of 
these borrowers’ interest payments in future years. This investment 
capital is at risk of loss when Lenders’ respective borrowers enter into 
loans, revolving credit facilities, or other structured financing vehicles 
for their projects, as these borrowers could default on their payment 
obligations. For these reasons, Lenders endeavor to identify, 
implement, and standardize new protocols aimed at reducing the risk 
of borrower non-payment or default.  
 
commercial wind turbines were as follows: (1) Siemens; (2) Vestas; (3) GE 
Renewable Energy; (4) Enercon; (5) Nordex SE; (6) Senvion; (7) Goldwind 
(Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd.); (8) Sinovel Wind; (9) 
Suzlon; and (10) MHI Vestas Offshore Wind; Denmark. Many of these companies 
have their main corporate headquarters and manufacturing facilities located outside 
the U.S.). 
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During 2020, certain Lenders faced an increased risk of 
borrower non-payment or default as a consequence of their respective 
borrowers’ entering into contracts with vague, faulty, or missing force 
majeure terms, or with insufficient equipment delivery time buffers. 
As discussed in Part III.B.1.a, due to different drafting preferences 
among contracting parties during the contract drafting stage, certain 
Developers possessed supply contracts and EPC Contracts that lacked 
force majeure provisions, contained force majeure clauses that did not 
cover or were vague about covering either COVID-19 or COVID-19 
Threats, or contained force majeure clauses that were inconsistent with 
other contracts for the same project and that led to certain project 
parties’ non-performance. Also, as discussed in Part III.A.2., certain 
of these contracts possessed equipment delivery periods whose 
durations were too short, given the unforeseen supply chain 
disruptions that COVID-19 initiated. These omissions, vague 
contractual terms, and inconsistencies across contracts likely 
jeopardized lending arrangements into which these Developers had 
entered. While various Lenders may have been able to craft work-out 
arrangements with certain of their Developer borrowers, other Lenders 
may have been less fortunate and may have lost some or all of their 
investment capital. 
 
To enhance their risk reduction strategies and increase the 
probability of fulfilling their investment-backed expectations, in 2020, 
Lenders adopted additional safeguards as part of their standard vetting 
procedures regarding potential borrowers. For instance, as of mid-
second quarter 2020, credit committees at certain Lenders involved in 
M&A transactions, such as investment banks, began requiring a new 
section in the standard pre-merger due diligence memo that focused on 
force majeure events.139 This requirement addressed Lenders’ 
respective credit committees’ elevated concerns regarding risk 
exposure across firm portfolios. Adding this improvement to the 
borrower vetting process has better positioned credit committees to 
more accurately assess equity and debt investors’ relative risk 
exposure to force majeure-induced delays.140 This strategic tweak will 
aid in Lenders’ risk minimization by reducing their future loss 
exposure risk, preventing against future borrower loan defaults to the 













restructurings and other work-outs that they would otherwise need to 




During 2020, the domestic wind and solar industries were each 
hit with a double whammy. Not only did they face issues with the step-
downs and impending sunsets of both the PTC and the ITC, but, as a 
result of the COVID-19 pandemic, Developers and Lenders doing 
business in these sectors also faced unexpected disruptions to their 
normal practices. Also, COIVD-19 Threats jolted many Developers 
into pivoting abruptly to implement dramatic changes to their 
workplace staffing procedures. Developers’ equipment sourcing and 
acquisition practices took on a game-like quality, making each 
Developer effectively a competitor for goods relative to other similarly 
situated market players who were vying for products that had suddenly 
become scarce commodities. Suppliers and purchasers globally found 
themselves focusing on their contracts’ force majeure provisions, 
putting them under a microscope, scrutinizing their content, and 
endeavoring to enforce them in unprecedented numbers. Moreover, 
although Treasury ultimately extended certain milestones for both the 
PTC and ITC during mid-second quarter 2020, the weeks leading up 
to that time were fraught with the uncertainty of whether such an 
extension, in fact, would be granted. Developers were forced to 
withstand the COVID-19 Threats and rebound from these 
unanticipated disruptions within their standard operations. As a result, 
COVID-19 Threats sent certain Developers scrambling, due to the 
urgency of meeting certain federally-mandated milestones under the 
PTC and ITC, in order to qualify for the maximum benefit each of 
these tax credits respectively afforded, or to qualify for either tax credit 
whatsoever.  
 
While COVID-19 Threats stressed the domestic wind and solar 
industries, COVID-19 impacts’ rattling of the global equipment supply 
chain amid workforce shortages helped to magnify certain procedural 
road bumps that could be smoothed. It also highlighted to Developers 
and Lenders alike other areas for improvement and innovation. 
COVID-19’s unexpected impacts on these renewable energy industry 
market players caused them to re-examine and streamline certain of 
their practices. This included re-evaluating external, outward-facing 
practices. As a result, Developers across both the wind and solar 
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standards across contracts, including having consistent, well-crafted 
force majeure contractual provisions in contracts for the same project. 
This helped to elevate the contract drafting standard in both industries.  
 
Addressing COVID-19 Threats also accelerated the refinement 
of internal practices that could be automated. Many Developers 
adopted more technologically sophisticated strategies for data 
collection through state-of-the-art drone and LIDAR usage. They also 
placed greater reliance on a more streamlined workforce. As a result 
of breaking from the norm and incorporating these practices into their 
regular operational routines, Developers reached certain project 
development milestones during early and mid-2020 in a much more 
condensed period of time than they likely would have, absent COVID-
19 impacts. COVID-19 impacts also caused market players to remove 
certain obstructions in industry-wide procedures, such as those that 
existed in the project permitting process. They also caused Developers 
to re-think their procurement strategies and resulted in the finance 
industry strengthening its pre-merger due diligence disclosure 
requirements for M&A transactions.  
 
Collectively, COVID-19, COVID-19 Threats, and COVID-19 
impacts proved to be an unexpected yet valuable catalyst, accelerating 
and advancing the technological and operational evolution of the 
domestic wind and solar industries, with the added benefit of elevating 
industry-wide standards throughout these industries and within the 
U.S. finance industry. Indeed, COVID-19 sparked a brief upheaval 
among Developers and Lenders within the U.S. wind and solar 
industries in early 2020. Nevertheless, these Developers and Lenders 
were able to adapt nimbly to their new and unusual circumstances by 
capitalizing on technological know-how. This yielded operational 
benefits, produced certain positive technological outcomes, and 
enabled Developers and Lenders within these industries to incorporate 
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